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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/04/2006

Accident number: 53

Accident time: 12:34

Accident Date: 10/11/1997

Where it occurred: Chianga Railway
Bridge, Longonjo
District, Huambo
Province

Country: Angola

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Vegetation removal
accident

Date of main report: 14/11/1997

ID original source: GP

Name of source: INAROEE

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast

Ground condition: bridge and surrounds
hidden root mat
metal scrap
rocks/stones

Date record created: 23/01/2004

Date last modified: 23/01/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Grid Square 1876

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:
Map sheet: 255

Map edition:
Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate equipment (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
use of pick (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
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non injurious accident (?)

Accident report
The demining group were using a one-man drill at the time. In this, the deminer used the
vegetation clearance and excavation tools as well as the detector. Every hour he had a ten
minute rest break.
No independent accident report was made. The demining group carried out an internal
accident report that was sent to the country MAC on14th November 1997 and was found on
file there. The following summarises the content of that document.
The demining group started work at the site on 14th October 1997. The accident occurred in
an area under a road bridge that passed over a railway line. Due to the "fragmented remains
of a barbed wire fence" the deminers were working using an excavation technique that
utilised a "probe and a short handled hoe". The deminer was also equipped with a hand
trowel, a bucket for metal, garden shears, an end-of-lane stick, marking string and pegs, and
a visor and a "blast protection jacket".
The victim began work at 07:00 and had worked with a ten minute break each hour until 12:34
when the accident occurred. The method involved excavating "to a depth of 20cm using a
sideways sweeping motion" with the hoe [pick]. He had found one mine that morning and as
he worked forward he encountered a rock ledge at only 5cm depth. He uncovered the rock for
three metres until the ledge ended. At the edge of the rock was a tree root that the deminer
tried to cut with the hoe. Either the movement of the tree root initiated the mine that was
beside the edge of the rock or his hoe slipped and he initiated a PPM-2 with it. He was thrown
backward two metres and his visor flew forward 1.5 metres. He landed on his back and had
"no recollection of the blast". He stood up and started to collect his tools. He was "obviously
confused". The paramedic led him to the medical post.
The report did not state it, but implied that the deminer's visor and blast jacket were damaged
because they "are now held in the Huambo mines training room".

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the victim was not using the hoe according to SOPs and was
responsible for the accident. They commented that the supervisor should have supplied the
deminer with "loppers", held in the central administration area.

Recommendations
The recommendations listed in the report were largely a record of "actions taken". For
example, the victim had been moved to other duties until having passed a refresher course,
the supervisor had been "forcefully reminded" that he should think about the deminers' needs
and ensure they have the tools for the job, the Operations Officer had been "forcefully
reminded" that it was his responsibility to ensure that the necessary tools were available and
to brief the Programme Manager if they were not. It was also mentioned that the demining
group was sourcing further loppers to ensure that there were enough for one between two
men.

Victim Report
Victim number: 72

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes
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Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not applicable

Protection issued: Short frontal vest

Protection used: Short frontal vest,
Long visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:

COMMENT
No medical report was made available. The victim was shocked and confused but no injuries
were recorded.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the
deminer was working improperly and his errors went uncorrected.
The investigators report that the group was sourcing more loppers and this may be taken to
imply that sufficient numbers of the tool were not available. If this was so, the failure to
provide appropriate tools would be a serious management failing. The secondary cause is
listed as “Inadequate equipment”.
A "lopper" is usually a long handled tool for pruning the small branches of trees. The demining
group's "lopper" was not seen. The use of a short-handled hoe or pick for excavation is fairly
common. A similar tool was also used by this demining group in Mozambique and by all
groups operating throughout Afghanistan.
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